The Why Platform for Deductive Program Verification

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The ProVal project — http://proval.lri.fr/

• Foundations of **ProVal**: the Coq project

- ${\ensuremath{\,\circ}}$ type theory: type \simeq logic specification
- $\bullet\,$ Curry-Howard isomorphism: proof $\simeq\,$ program
- functional programs only
- goals of **ProVal**:
 - to deal with imperative programs (C, Java)
 - to apply our methods to industrial cases

- 1999: a first approach for programs with side effects in Coq
- 2000-2003: EU project Verificard (verification of Java Card applets with industrial partners GemPlus, Schlumberger)
- \bullet 2001-: stand-alone $\rm W{\ensuremath{\rm HY}}$ tool, to use both automatic and interactive provers
- 2003-: KRAKATOA tool for JAVA programs
- 2004-: CADUCEUS tool for C programs
- 2007: The WHY platform

- overview of the Why platform
- verification technique
- I discharging the verification conditions
- ongoing and future work

overview of the Why platform

- general goal: prove behavioral properties of pointer programs
- pointer program = program manipulating data structures with in-place mutable fields
- we currently focus on C and Java programs

two kinds

- **safety**, that is
 - no null pointer dereference
 - no array access out of bounds (no buffer overflow)
 - no division by zero
 - no arithmetic overflow
 - termination

behavioral correctness

• the program does what it is expected to do

- specification as **annotations** at the source code level
 - Java: an extension of JML (Java Modeling Language)
 - C: our own language (mostly JML-inspired)
- generation of verification conditions (VCs)
 - using Hoare logic / weakest preconditions
 - other similar approaches: static verification (ESC/Java, SPEC#), B method, etc.
- multi-prover approach
 - off-the-shelf provers, as many as possible
 - automatic provers (Alt-Ergo, Simplify, Yices, Z3, CVC3, etc.)
 - proof assistants (Coq, PVS, Isabelle/HOL, etc.)

binary search: search a sorted array of integers for a given value

famous example; see J. Bentley's *Programming Pearls* most programmers are wrong on their first attempt to write binary search

```
int binary_search(int* t, int n, int v) {
  int l = 0, u = n-1;
 while (1 <= u ) {
    int m = (1 + u) / 2:
    if (t[m] < v)
      1 = m + 1;
    else if (t[m] > v)
    u = m - 1;
    else
      return m;
  }
  return -1;
```

we want to prove:

- absence of runtime error
- 2 termination
- e behavioral correctness

Binary Search: Safety

- no division by zero
- no array access out of bounds

```
/*@ requires n >= 0 && \valid_range(t,0,n-1) */
int binary_search(int* t, int n, int v) {
    int l = 0, u = n-1;
    /*@ invariant 0 <= 1 && u <= n-1 */
    while (l <= u ) {</pre>
```

DEMO

. . .

we add a variant to prove termination

```
/*@ requires n >= 0 && \valid_range(t,0,n-1) */
int binary_search(int* t, int n, int v) {
    int l = 0, u = n-1;
    /*@ invariant 0 <= 1 && u <= n-1
    @ variant u - 1
    @*/
while (l <= u ) {
    ...
}</pre>
```

DEMO

Binary Search: Behavioral Specification

we add a **postcondition** for the success case

```
/*0 requires n >= 0 && \ \
 @ ensures \result >= 0 => t[\result] == v
 @*/
int binary_search(int* t, int n, int v) {
  int l = 0, u = n-1;
 /*@ invariant 0 <= 1 && u <= n-1
   Q variant u - 1
   @*/
 while (1 <= u ) {
    . . .
```

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Binary Search: Behavioral Specification (cont'd)

we add a postcondition for the failure case \Rightarrow we need a precondition which says that the array is sorted

```
/*@ requires
    n \ge 0 \&\& \valid_range(t,0,n-1) \&\&
  0
  \bigcirc \forall int k1, int k2;
         0 \le k1 \le k2 \le n-1 \Longrightarrow t[k1] \le t[k2]
  0
  0
    ensures
  0
       (\result >= 0 && t[\result] == v) ||
       (\text{result} == -1 \&\&
  0
          \forall int k; 0 \le k \le n \Longrightarrow t[k] != v)
  0
  @*/
int binary_search(int* t, int n, int v) {
  . . .
```

Binary Search: Behavioral Specification (cont'd)

requires a stronger invariant

```
int binary_search(int* t, int n, int v) {
  int l = 0, u = n-1;
  /*@ invariant
     0 <= 1 \&\& u <= n-1 \&\&
    \bigcirc \forall int k;
             0 \le k \le n \Longrightarrow t[k] == v \Longrightarrow 1 \le k \le u
    0
    Q variant u-1
    @*/
  while (1 <= u ) {
     . . .
  }
```

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Binary Search: Arithmetic Overflows

finally, let's prove that there is no arithmetic overflow... there is one!

in statement

int m = (1 + u) / 2;

a possible overflow is signaled; a possible fix is

```
int m = 1 + (u - 1) / 2;
```

see

- Google: "Read All About It: Nearly All Binary Searches and Mergesorts are Broken"
- "Types, Bytes, and Separation Logic" POPL'07

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$$m = 1 + (u - 1) / 2;$$

see

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academic case studies

- Schorr-Waite algorithm [SEFM'05]
- selection sort, insertion sort, heapsort, quicksort
- Dijkstra's shortest path
- Bresenham's line drawing
- Knuth-Morris-Pratt string searching
- n-queens (backtracking counting of solutions)
- several MIX programs from The Art of Computer Programming

industrial case studies

- Java applets
 - Java Card transactions at Gemalto [N. Rousset, SEFM'06]
 - Industrial banking applet Payflex (Banking) 4600 loc
 - SIMSave: SIM/Server synchro 3800 loc
 - IAS: government security platform 20 000 loc
 - Demoney applet provided by Trusted Logic
 - PSE applet provided by Gemalto [AMAST'04]
- avionics software from Dassault Aviation [T. Hubert, HAV'07]
 - embedded C code checked for safety 70 000 loc
- undergoing collaboration with CEA, Airbus, France Télécom, Continental SA, Dassault Aviation

verification technique


we need

- to get VCs from annotated programs
 - how to model the memory
 - what can be shared between C and Java
- 2 to discharge the VCs
 - how to use both automatic and interactive theorem provers

our solution: the use of an intermediate language, Why, which is

- a VC generator
- a common front-end to various provers

Platform Overview




Why is a verification condition generator for a language with

- variables containing pure values, no alias (~ Hoare-logic language)
- usual control structures (loops, tests, etc.)
- exceptions
- (possibly recursive) functions
- polymorphic first-order logic with equality and arithmetic

Why is similar to Boogie (SPEC# project)

Why is also responsible for **translating** verification conditions to the **native logics** of all provers

Generating the Verification Conditions



we need to translate pointer programs to alias-free programs

naive idea: model the memory as a big array

using the theory of arrays

 $\begin{array}{l} \texttt{acc}:\texttt{mem},\texttt{int}\rightarrow\texttt{int}\\ \texttt{upd}:\texttt{mem},\texttt{int},\texttt{int}\rightarrow\texttt{mem} \end{array}$

 $\forall m p v, \ \operatorname{acc}(\operatorname{upd}(m, p, v), p) = v \\ \forall m p_1 p_2 v, \ p_1 \neq p_2 \Rightarrow \operatorname{acc}(\operatorname{upd}(m, p_1, v), p_2) = \operatorname{acc}(m, p_2)$

Naive Memory Model

```
then the C program
struct S { int x; int y; } p;
...
p.x = 0;
p.y = 1;
//@ assert p.x == 0
```

becomes

$$m := upd(m, px, 0);$$

$$m := upd(m, py, 1);$$

assert acc(m, px) = 0

the verification condition is

acc(upd(upd(m, px, 0), py, 1), px) = 0

we use the **component-as-array** model (Burstall-Bornat)

each structure/object field is mapped to a different array

relies on the property "two different fields cannot be aliased"

strong consequence: prevents pointer casts and unions (a priori)

Benefits of the Component-As-Array Model

```
struct S { int x; int y; } p;
...
p.x = 0;
p.y = 1;
//@ assert p.x == 0
```

becomes


$$\begin{array}{ll} x &:= & \operatorname{upd}(x,p,0); \\ y &:= & \operatorname{upd}(y,p,1); \\ \operatorname{assert} \operatorname{acc}(x,p) = 0 \end{array}$$

the verification condition is

```
acc(upd(x, p, 0), p) = 0
```


Component-As-Array Model and Pointer Arithmetic

struct S { int x; short y; struct S *next; } t[3];



Component-As-Array Model and Pointer Arithmetic

struct S { int x; short y; struct S *next; } t[3];



on top of Burstall-Bornat model, we add some separation analysis

- each pointer is assigned a zone
- zones are unified when pointers are assigned / compared
- functions are **polymorphic** wrt zones


similar to ML-type inference

then the component-as-array model is refined according to zones

Separation Analysis for Deductive Verification [HAV'07]


Separation Analysis

struct S { int x; short y; struct S *next; } t1[3], t2[2];



Separation Analysis

struct S { int x; short y; struct S *next; } t1[3], t2[2];



little challenge for program verification proposed by P. Müller: count the number n of non-zero values in an integer array t, then copy these values in a freshly allocated array of size n

```
void m(int t[], int length) {
  int count=0, i, *u;
  for (i=0 ; i < length; i++)</pre>
    if (t[i] > 0) count++;
  u = (int *)calloc(count,sizeof(int));
  count = 0;
  for (i=0 ; i < length; i++)</pre>
    if (t[i] > 0) u[count++] = t[i];
```

```
void m(int t[], int length) {
  int count=0, i, *u;
  //@ invariant count == num_of_pos(0,i-1,t) ...
  for (i=0 ; i < length; i++)</pre>
    if (t[i] > 0) count++:
 //@ assert count == num_of_pos(0,length-1,t)
  u = (int *)calloc(count,sizeof(int));
  count = 0;
  //@ invariant count == num_of_pos(0,i-1,t) ...
  for (i=0 ; i < length; i++)</pre>
    if (t[i] > 0) u[count++] = t[i];
```

12 verification conditions

- without separation analysis: 10/12 automatically proved
- \bullet with separation analysis: 12/12 automatically proved

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discharging the verification conditions

we want to use off-the-shelf provers, as many as possible

requirements

- first-order logic
- equality and arithmetic
- quantifiers (memory model, user algebraic models)

automatic decision procedures

- provers a la Nelson-Oppen
 - Alt-Ergo [http://alt-ergo.lri.fr/, SMT'07, SMT'08]
 - Simplify, Yices, Z3, CVC3
- resolution based provers
 - harvey, rv-sat, Zenon

interactive proof assistants

- Coq, PVS, Isabelle/HOL
- HOL4, HOL Light, Mizar

- built-in theories vs algebraic models
- typing issues: provers do not implement the same logics
- trust in prover results
- provers collaboration

some provers implement built-in theories, such as

- purely applicative arrays
- real arithmetic
- bit vectors
- tuples

in practice, the intersection is limited to linear arithmetic

so we **axiomatize** the theory we need and rely on the quantifier instantiation capabilities (both risky and incomplete)

Example 1: Bresenham Line Drawing Algorithm

// draw a line from (0,0) to (x2,y2) assuming 0 <= y2 <= x2

```
void bresenham() {
  int x = 0;
  int y = 0;
  int e = 2 * y2 - x2;
 for (x = 0; x \le x2; x++)
    // plot (x,y) at this point
    if (e < 0)
      e += 2 * y2;
    else {
      v++;
      e += 2 * (y2 - x2);
```

the code only uses additions,

but the loop invariant requires non-linear arithmetic

```
/*@ invariant
@ 0 <= x <= x2 + 1 &&
@ e == 2 * (x + 1) * y2 - (2 * y + 1) * x2 &&
@ 2 * (y2 - x2) <= e <= 2 * y2
@*/
for (x = 0; x <= x2; x++) {
   // plot (x,y) at this point
   ...
```

we can help the provers with the following axioms

```
/*@ axiom distr_left :
    @ \forall int a, int b, int c; a * (b+c) == a*b + a*c
    @*/
/*@ axiom distr_right :
    @ \forall int a, int b, int c; (b+c) * a == b*a + c*a
    @*/
```

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```
int count_bits(int x) {
    int d, c;
    for (c = 0; d = x&-x; x -= d) c++;
    return c;
}
```

x&-x extracts the least significant bit of x

we introduce a function symbol for the number of bits

```
//@ logic int nbits(int x)
/*@ ensures \result == nbits(x) */
int count_bits(int x) {
  int d, c;
  /*@ invariant c + nbits(x) == nbits(\at(x,init))
    @ variant nbits(x)
    @*/
  for (c = 0; d = x\&-x; x -= d) c++;
  return c;
}
```

then we axiomatize **nbits**:

```
//@ axiom nbits_nonneg : \forall int x; nbits(x) >= 0
//@ axiom nbits_zero : nbits(0) == 0
/*@ axiom lowest_bit_zero :
  0 \quad \text{forall int } x; (x\&-x) == 0 \iff x == 0
  @*/
/*@ axiom remove_one_bit :
      forall int x;
  0
           x != 0 \Rightarrow nbits(x - (x\&-x)) == nbits(x) - 1
  0
```

@*/

static data structure for a priority queue containing integers

void clear(); // empties the queue void push(int x); // inserts a new element int max(); // returns the maximal element int pop(); // removes and returns the maximal element

Example 3: Priority Queues

//@ type bag

//@ logic bag empty_bag()

//@ logic bag singleton_bag(int x)

//@ logic bag union_bag(bag b1, bag b2)

/*@ logic bag add_bag(int x, bag b)
@ { union_bag(b, singleton_bag(x)) } */

//@ logic int occ_bag(int x, bag b)

```
//@ logic bag model()
```


```
//@ ensures model() == empty_bag()
void clear();
```

```
//@ ensures model() == add_bag(x, \old(model()))
void push(int x);
```

```
//@ ensures is_max_bag(model(), \result)
int max();
```

Example 3: Priority Queues

implementation: heap encoded in an array



bag { 2, 7, 7, 8, 10, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17 }

- //@ type tree
- //@ logic tree Empty()
- //@ logic tree Node(tree 1, int x, tree r)

//@ predicate is_heap(tree t)

//@ axiom is_heap_def_1: is_heap(Empty())

. . .

```
//@ logic bag bag_of_tree(tree t)
```

. . .

//@ logic tree tree_of_array(int *t, int root, int bound)

#define MAXSIZE 100

int heap[MAXSIZE];

int size = 0;

//@ invariant size_inv : 0 <= size < MAXSIZE</pre>

//@ invariant is_heap: is_heap(tree_of_array(heap, 0, size))

/*@ logic bag model()
 @ { bag_of_tree(tree_of_array(heap, 0, size)) } */

verification conditions are expressed in polymorphic first-order logic

need to be **translated** to logics with various type systems:

- unsorted logic (Simplify, Zenon)
- simply sorted logic (SMT provers)
- parametric polymorphism (CVC Lite, PVS)
- polymorphic logic (Alt-Ergo, Coq, Isabelle/HOL)

forgetting types is unsound

```
//@ type color
//@ logic color black
//@ logic color white
//@ axiom color: \forall color c; c==white || c==black
```

$$\forall c, \ c = \texttt{white} \lor c = \texttt{black} \ \vdash \ ot$$

several type encodings are used

- monomorphization
 - may loop
- usual encoding "types-as-predicates"
 - does not combine nicely with most provers
- new encoding with type-decorated terms Handling Polymorphism in Automated Deduction [CADE'07]

- some provers apply the de Bruijn principle and thus are safe
 - Coq, HOL family
- most provers have to be trusted
 - Simplify, Yices
 - PVS, Mizar
- some provers output proof traces
 - Alt-Ergo, CVC family, Zenon

most of the time, we run the various provers **in parallel**, expecting at least one of them to discharge the VCs

if not, we turn to interactive theorem provers

- no real collaboration between automatic provers
- from Coq or Isabelle, one can call automatic theorem provers
 - proofs are checked when available
 - results are trusted otherwise

conclusion, ongoing and future work

the Why platform features

- behavioral specification languages for C and Java programs, at source code level
- deductive program verification using original memory models
- multi-provers backend (interactive and automatic)

successfully applied on both

- academic case studies
- industrial case studies

free software, at http://why.lri.fr/

• floating point arithmetic

- allows to specify rounding and method errors
- Formal Verification of Floating-Point Programs [ARITH'07]
- mostly interactive proof (currently Coq, eventually PVS)

• ownership

• when class/type invariants must hold?

• automatic generation of loop invariants and preconditions

using abstract interpretation techniques [HAV'07]

• Eclipse plugin (C and Java)

• selection of relevant hypotheses [FTP'07]

• in Why, in Alt-Ergo

- more realistic C fragment (unions & pointer casts, goto's, etc.)
- more ambitious specification language ACSL: ANSI/ISO C Specification Language
- combination of deductive verification and abstract interpretation

see http://frama-c.cea.fr/