


Pôle Preuves et langages

Jean-Christophe Filliâtre

19 octobre 2022



1. structure
2. scientific activities
3. focus (15 minutes) : A. Paskevich and J.-H. Jourdan
Proof of programs with Why3 and Creusot
4. focus (15 minutes) : K. Nguyễn
Occurrence Typing and Set-theoretic types
for dynamic languages

- 26 permanent members



Idir



Thibaut



Bruno



Véronique



Frédéric



Valentin



Sylvie



Frédéric



Hubert



Sylvain



Évelyne



Gilles



Jean-Christophe



Armaël



Jacques-Henri



Chantal



Claude



Guillaume



Kim



Andrei



Christine



Mihaela



Safouan



Théo



Burkhardt



Lina

- 4 postdocs and engineers
- 24 PhD students

- 4 teams
 - Arithmétique des ordinateurs (G. Melquiond)
 - Calcul, langages et compilation (K. Nguyễn)
 - Preuve de programmes (A. Paskevich)
 - Preuve mécanisée (C. Keller)
- 2 Inria EPC
 - Deducteam (G. Dowek)
 - Toccata (C. Marché)

Arithmétique des ordinateurs

CM

GM


SB

Arithmétique des ordinateurs


Preuve de
programmes


SC	CM
JCF	GM
AP	SB
AG	
MS	EC
ST	VB
LY	JHJ
IAS	BW


Arithmétique des ordinateurs



Arithmétique des ordinateurs







Responsable : Guillaume Melquiond

- IEEE 754 floating-point numbers
- GMP-like big integers
- interval arithmetic

 Sylvie Boldo, Guillaume Melquiond.
Some Formal Tools for Computer Arithmetic : Flocq and Gappa.
ARITH 2021

Sylvie Boldo co-leader GDR IM's GT ARITH

Responsable : Kim Nguyễn

- formal semantics
- study and design of languages
- programming and domain-specific languages



Valentin Blot.

A direct computational interpretation of second-order arithmetic via update recursion. LICS 2022.

Responsable : Andrei Paskevich

- deductive program verification
- reasoning on mutable memory
- verification of properties of systems

 Cláudio Belo Lourenço Denis Cousineau, Florian Faissole, Claude Marché, David Mentré, Hiroaki Inoue.
Automated Verification of Temporal Properties of Ladder Programs. Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems 2021.

Responsable : Chantal Keller

- proof systems
- interaction between proof systems
- formalized libraries

 Frédéric Blanqui, Gilles Dowek, Émilie Grienemberger, Gabriel Hondet, François Thiré.
Some Axioms for Mathematics. FSCD 2021

International

- EMC2 [ERC Synergy →2025]
- EuroProofNet [COST →2025]
- FRESCO [ERC Consolidator →2026]

National

- France–Japan [Sakura →2023]
- Gospel [ANR →2026]
- ICSPA [ANR →2024]
- NARCO [ANR →2026]
- NuSCAP [ANR →2025]
- SecurEval
[PEPR Cybersécurité →2027]

Industrial

- AdaCore [bilatéral →2023]
- Langages dynamiques pour les données
[Oracle Labs →2022]
- Mitsubishi Electric R&D
[bilatéral →2023]
- TrustInSoft [bilatéral →2023]
- thèses CIFRE
[OCamlPro, Tarides →2023]

Mainly at LMF :

- Alt-Ergo
- CoqInterval
- Coq-num-analysis
- Coquelicot
- CDuce
- Creusot
- Cubicle
- Datacert
- Datalogcert
- Dedukti
- Ekstrakto
- Flocq
- Gappa

- Lambdapi
- OntoEventB
- SMTCoq
- Sniper
- Why3
- WhyMP

LMF also contributes to :

- Coq
- HOL-TestGen
- Iris
- Isabelle
- OCaml

In preparation :

- Léo Andrès [+OCamlPro]
- Luc Chabassier
- Xavier Denis
- Louise Dubois De Prisque
- Thiago Felicissimo
- Valentin Fouillard [+LISN]
- Paul Geneau de Lamarlière [+MERCE]
- Yoan Géran
- Emilie Grienberger
- Baptiste Gueuziec [+CEA]
- Alexandrina Korneva
- Antoine Lanco
- Mickael Laurent [+U Paris Cité]
- Amélie Ledein
- Nicolas Meric

- Glen Mevel [+Inria]
- Josué Moreau
- Houda Mouhcine [+LIPN +Inria Paris]
- Clément Pascutto [+Tarides]
- Quentin Petitjean [+LIG]
- Andrew Samokhish [+K. Inside]
- Julien Simonnet [+CEA]
- Rébecca Zucchini

Defended :

- Yacine El Haddad [09/21]
- Gaspard Ferey [06/21]
- Diane Gallois-Wong [+LIP6] [03/21]
- Quentin Garchery [01/22]
- Guillaume Girol [+CEA] [10/22]
- Gabriel Hondet [09/22]
- Yaëlle Vinçont [12/21, +CEA]

Proof of programs with WHY3 and CREUSOT

Andrei Paskevich Jacques-Henri Jourdan

LMF — October 19, 2022

Deductive program verification

(Given an array **a** of signed integers, compute the maximum sum **s** *)*
(of its contiguous subarray. The sum of an empty subarray is 0. *)*

```
val maximum_subarray (a: array int): (s: int)
```

Deductive program verification

(Given an array a of signed integers, compute the maximum sum s *)*
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```
let maximum_subarray (a: array int): (s: int)
=
  let ref max = 0 in
  let ref cur = 0 in
  for i = 0 to length a - 1 do
    cur += a[i];
    if cur < 0 then cur <- 0;
    if cur > max then max <- cur;
  done;
  return max
```

Deductive program verification

(Given an array a of signed integers, compute the maximum sum s *)*
(of its contiguous subarray. The sum of an empty subarray is 0. *)*

```
let maximum_subarray (a: array int): (s: int)
  ensures { forall l h: int. 0 <= l <= h <= length a -> sum a l h <= s }
  ensures { exists l h: int. 0 <= l <= h <= length a /\ sum a l h = s }
=
  let ref max = 0 in
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```

=

```
let ref max = 0 in
let ref cur = 0 in
```

```
for i = 0 to length a - 1 do
```

```
  cur += a[i];
  if cur < 0 then ( cur <- 0 );
  if cur > max then ( max <- cur )
done;
return max
```

Deductive program verification

(Given an array a of signed integers, compute the maximum sum s *)*
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=
  let ref max = 0 in
  let ref cur = 0 in
  let ghost ref cl = 0 in
  let ghost ref lo = 0 in
  let ghost ref hi = 0 in
  for i = 0 to length a - 1 do
    invariant { forall l: int. 0 <= l <= i -> sum a l i <= cur }
    invariant { 0 <= cl <= i /\ sum a cl i = cur }
    invariant { forall l h: int. 0 <= l <= h <= i -> sum a l h <= max }
    invariant { 0 <= lo <= hi <= i /\ sum a lo hi = max }
    cur += a[i];
    if cur < 0 then ( cur <- 0; cl <- i+1 );
    if cur > max then ( max <- cur; lo <- cl; hi <- i+1 )
  done;
  return max
```

WHY3 proof session

File Edit Tools View Help

Status Theories/Goals

- maximum_subarray.mlw
 - Top
 - maximum_subarray'vc [VC for maximum_subarray]
 - split_vc
 - 0 [loop invariant init]
 - 1 [loop invariant init]
 - 2 [loop invariant init]
 - 3 [loop invariant init]
 - 4 [index in array bounds]
 - 5 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 6 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 7 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 8 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 9 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 10 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 11 [loop invariant preservation]
 - Z3 4.8.12
 - Alt-Ergo 2.4.1
 - 12 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 13 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 14 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 15 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 16 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 17 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 18 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 19 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 20 [loop invariant preservation]
 - 21 [postcondition]
 - 22 [postcondition]
 - 23 [out of loop bounds]

Task maximum_subarray.mlw

```
5
6
7 let maximum_subarray (a: array int): (s: int)
8 ensures { forall l h: int. 0 <= l <= h <= length a -> sum a l h <= s }
9 ensures { exists l h: int. 0 <= l <= h <= length a /\ sum a l h = s }
10 =
11 let ref max = 0 in
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17   invariant { forall l: int. 0 <= l <= i -> sum a l i <= cur }
18   invariant { 0 <= cl <= i /\ sum a cl i = cur }
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21   cur += a[i];
22   if cur < 0 then ( cur <- 0; cl <- i+1 );
23   if cur > max then ( max <- cur; lo <- cl; hi <- i+1 )
24 done;
25 return max
26
27
```

0/0/0

Messages

Log

Edited proof

Prover output

Counterexample

WHY3 in a nutshell

WHYML, a programming language


- type polymorphism • variants
- limited support for higher order
- pattern matching • exceptions
- integer & FP computer arithmetic
- mutable data with controlled aliasing
- ghost code and ghost data

WHY3, a program verification tool

- VC generation using WP or SP
- 70+ VC *transformations* ($\approx$ tactics)
- support for 25+ ATP and ITP systems
- produces OCaml and C code

WHYML, a specification language

- polymorphic & algebraic types
- limited support for higher order
- inductive predicates



Three different ways of using WHY3

- as a logical language
 - a convenient front-end to many theorem provers
 - probabilistic programs: EASYCRYPT (Barthe et al.)
- as a programming language for correct-by-construction software
 - see examples in our gallery
<https://toccata.gitlabpages.inria.fr/toccata/gallery/why3.en.html>
 - Multiple Precision arithmetic library: WHYMP (Melquiond Rieu-Helfft)
- as an intermediate verification language
 - Ada programs: SPARK (AdaCore)
 - C programs: FRAMA-C (Marché Moy)
 - Java programs: KRAKATOA (Marché Paulin Urbain)
 - Rust programs: CREUSOT (Denis Jourdan Marché)

WHYMP: arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic

The GNU Multiple Precision arithmetic library (GMP)

- free software, widely used
- state-of-the-art algorithms, unmatched performances

WHYMP: arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic

The GNU Multiple Precision arithmetic library (GMP)

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- state-of-the-art algorithms, unmatched performances
- highly intricate algorithms written in low-level C and ASM
- ill-suited for random testing

GMP 5.0.4: *“Two bugs in multiplication [...] with **extremely low** probability [...]. Two bugs in the gcd code [...] For uniformly distributed random operands, the likelihood is **infinitesimally small**.”*

WHYMP: arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic

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
Objectives

- produce a **verified** library compatible with GMP
- attain **performances** comparable to a no-assembly GMP


The WHY3 workflow

GMP library


The WHY3 workflow




The WHY3 workflow




The WHY3 workflow




The WHY3 workflow



The WHY3 workflow



The WHY3 workflow



Example: subtracting 1 from a long integer

Original macro (simplified from 18-line `mpn_decr_u`)

```
#define mpn_decr_1(p)      \  
    mp_ptr __p = (p);    \  
    while ((*(__p++))-- == 0) ;
```

Example: subtracting 1 from a long integer

Original macro (simplified from 18-line `mpn_decr_u`)

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    mp_ptr __p = (p);    \  
    while ((*(__p++))-- == 0) ;
```

Conversion to WhyML

```
let wmpn_decr_1 (p: ptr uint64) : unit  
=  
  let ref lp = 0 in  
  while lp = 0 do  
    lp <- get p;  
    set p (sub_mod lp 1);  
    p <- p ++ 1;  
  done
```

Example: subtracting 1 from a long integer

Original macro (simplified from 18-line `mpn_decr_u`)

```
#define mpn_decr_1(p)      \
  mp_ptr __p = (p);      \
  while ((*(__p++))-- == 0) ;
```

Conversion to WhyML

```
let wmpn_decr_1 (p: ptr uint64) (ghost sz: int32) : unit
  requires { valid p sz }
  requires { 1 <= value p sz } (* <- real bug in GMP *)
  ensures { value p sz = value (old p) sz - 1 }
=
  let ref lp = 0 in
  while lp = 0 do
    lp <- get p;
    set p (sub_mod lp 1);
    p <- p ++ 1;
  done
```

Example: subtracting 1 from a long integer

Original macro (simplified from 18-line `mpn_decr_u`)

```
#define mpn_decr_1(p)      \
    mp_ptr __p = (p);      \
    while ((*(__p++))-- == 0) ;
```

Extraction to C

```
void wmpn_decr_1(uint64_t * p) {
    uint64_t lp = 0;
    while (lp == 0) {
        lp = *p;
        *p = lp - 1;
        p = p + 1;
    }
}
```

22 000 lines of WHYML code — 5 000 lines of extracted C code

Performance: comparable to GMP without assembly code

Supported operations:

- addition, subtraction, comparison
- multiplication: quadratic, Toom-Cook 2, Toom-Cook 2.5
- division: “schoolbook”
- square root: divide-and-conquer
- modular exponentiation with Montgomery reduction
- base conversion and input-output

A new systems programming language: Rust



High **performance**, high level of **control** with **safe abstraction mechanisms** and **concurrency features**.

Tends to replace C/C++ for many **sensitive applications**:

- Web browsers (Firefox),
- Cloud infrastructures (Amazon),
- Operating systems kernels (Linux),
- Embedded systems

How to guarantee **correctness of Rust code**?

Rust is well-suited for verification.

It has a **rich type system**.

- **Safety guarantees.**
 - No need to prove safety.
- **Non-aliasing guarantees.**
 - Helps reasoning with pointers.
- Type traits (i.e., type classes): **abstraction** and **genericity** mechanism.
 - Easy to write **reusable specifications**.

Creusot, a deductive verification tool for Rust.

- The user **annotates Rust code** with specifications.
- Creusot translates Rust into WhyML (**Why3 = Creusot's back-end**).
- **Exploits type system** (non-aliasing, genericity with traits, safety).

One crucial aspect of Creusot: **lightweight handling of pointers**.

Our big secret:

**Rust is a purely functional*
programming language**

... and this greatly helps verification.

*some squinting required.

Rust as a functional language

Local variables

```
fn incr(mut x: u64, y: u64) -> (u64, u64) {  
    x += y;  
    do_stuff();  
    (x, y)  
}
```

```
let incr x y =  
    let x = x + y in  
    do_stuff ();  
    (x, y)
```

As long as there is no pointer, **mutating variables = shadowing**.

We give a name to the value of each variable at each program point.
Variables can only be mutated directly, we can track their modifications.

`Box<T>` is Rust's type for **owned pointers**.

- I.e., pointers that are allocated on the heap ($\simeq$ `malloc`).
- Type system guarantee: **no alias**.

```
fn incr(x: Box<u64>, y: Box<u64>)
    -> (Box<u64>, Box<u64>) {
    *x += *y;
    do_stuff();
    (x, y)
}
```

```
let incr x y =
    let x = x + y in
    do_stuff();
    (x, y)
```

Because there is no alias, we know nobody else can mutate `x` and `y`.

Owned pointers functionally behave like their content.

Rust has another notion of pointer: **borrows**.

- **Temporary** pointer to a memory location.
- They are crucial to effective use of Rust.

Their handling in Creusot requires a new mechanism: **prophecies**.

- Prophecies allow **concise specifications**.
- But their soundness cause subtle **causality issues**.
 - We have a **strong meta-theoretical formalization**.

Occurrence Typing and Set-theoretic types for dynamic languages

Kim NGUYỄN

19 octobre 2022

Motivations

A function in JavaScript

```
1 function foo(x) {  
2   return (typeof(x) === "number")? x+1 : x.trim();  
3 }
```

Idiomatic in dynamic languages:

- ▶ JavaScript: optional arguments (`typeof(y) === "undefined"`)
- ▶ JavaScript: poor person's overloading
- ▶ Python: 5400 dynamic type tests in the standard library
- ▶ Python: `isinstance(x, (int, float, str))`

Motivations

A function in TypeScript (Microsoft)/Flow (Facebook)

```
1 function foo(x : number | string) : number | string {  
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$(\text{number}|\text{string}) \rightarrow (\text{number}|\text{string})$

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We present a **type system** with **occurrence typing** and:

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We present a **type system** with **occurrence typing** and:

- Expressive types: $(\text{number} \rightarrow \text{number}) \wedge (\text{string} \rightarrow \text{string})$
(e.g., `foo(42)+1`)

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- ▶ Inference (no need for user-defined type annotations)

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Motivations

A function in JavaScript

```
1 function foo(x) {  
2   return (is_number_or_function(x)) ? x+1 : x.trim();  
3 }
```

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We present a **type system** with **occurrence typing** and:

- ▶ Expressive types: $(\text{number} \rightarrow \text{number}) \wedge (\text{string} \rightarrow \text{string})$
(e.g., `foo(42)+1`)
- ▶ Inference (no need for user-defined type annotations)
- ▶ Works for checks with arbitrary expressions (eg, applications of user-defined functions)

Language

Functional language

Types $t ::= \text{Int} \mid \text{Bool} \mid t \rightarrow t$

Expressions $e ::= c \mid x \mid \lambda x.e \mid ee$

Values $v ::= c \mid \lambda x.e$

Call-by-value semantics:

$$(\lambda x.e)v \rightsquigarrow e\{v/x\}$$

Language

Functional language with set-theoretic types

Types $t ::= \text{Int} \mid \text{Bool} \mid t \rightarrow t \mid t \vee t \mid t \wedge t \mid \neg t \mid \text{Any}$

Expressions $e ::= c \mid x \mid \lambda x.e \mid ee$

Values $v ::= c \mid \lambda x.e$

Call-by-value semantics:

$$(\lambda x.e)v \rightsquigarrow e\{v/x\}$$

Language

Functional language with set-theoretic types and typecases

Types $t ::= \text{Int} \mid \text{Bool} \mid t \rightarrow t \mid t \vee t \mid t \wedge t \mid \neg t \mid \text{Any}$

Expressions $e ::= c \mid x \mid \lambda x.e \mid ee \mid (e \in t) ? e : e$

Values $v ::= c \mid \lambda x.e$

Call-by-value semantics:

$$(\lambda x.e)v \rightsquigarrow e\{v/x\}$$

Language

Functional language with set-theoretic types and typecases

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Values $v ::= c \mid \lambda x. e$

Call-by-value semantics:

$$(\lambda x. e)v \rightsquigarrow e\{v/x\}$$

$$(v \in t) ? e_1 : e_2 \rightsquigarrow e_1 \quad \text{if } v \in t$$

$$(v \in t) ? e_1 : e_2 \rightsquigarrow e_2 \quad \text{if } v \notin t$$

Type System

Occurrence Typing and Typecases Part

$$\begin{array}{c} [\epsilon_1] \frac{\Gamma \vdash e : t \quad \Gamma \vdash e_1 : t_1}{\Gamma \vdash (e \in t) ? e_1 : e_2 : t_1} \quad [\epsilon_2] \frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \neg t \quad \Gamma \vdash e_2 : t_2}{\Gamma \vdash (e \in t) ? e_1 : e_2 : t_2} \\[2ex] [\vee] \frac{\Gamma \vdash e' : t_1 \vee t_2 \quad \Gamma, x : t_1 \vdash e : t \quad \Gamma, x : t_2 \vdash e : t}{\Gamma \vdash e\{e'/x\} : t} \end{array}$$

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Rationale

- ▶ $[\vee]$ splits the type of the checked expression as necessary
- ▶ $[\epsilon_i]$ distribute the appropriate split to each branch

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Rationale (i.e., the essence of occurrence typing)

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Rationale (i.e., the essence of occurrence typing)

- ▶ $[\vee]$ splits the type of the checked expression as necessary
- ▶ $[\epsilon_i]$ distribute the appropriate split to each branch

Example: For $f : (\text{Int} \rightarrow (\text{Int} \vee \text{Bool})) \wedge (\neg \text{Int} \rightarrow \text{Bool})$
 $\lambda x. (f \ x \in \text{Int}) ? (f \ x) + x + 1 : 42$ has type $(\text{Int} \rightarrow \text{Int}) \wedge (\neg \text{Int} \rightarrow 42)$

Towards an algorithmic system

What is not algorithmic in $[V]$?

$$[V] \frac{\Gamma \vdash e' : t_1 \vee t_2 \quad \Gamma, x : t_1 \vdash e : t \quad \Gamma, x : t_2 \vdash e : t}{\Gamma \vdash e\{e'/x\} : t}$$

- ▶ It can be applied **anywhere** (on any expression)
- ▶ It can use any **subexpression**
- ▶ It can substitute any **occurrence(s)** of this subexpression

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- ▶ It can be applied **anywhere** (on any expression)
- ▶ It can use any **subexpression**
- ▶ It can substitute any **occurrence(s)** of this subexpression

Not syntax directed
 $\Rightarrow$ *Normal forms*

- ▶ It can use any **decomposition** of the type of e'

Not analytic
 $\Rightarrow$ Annotations

Maximal-Sharing Canonical Form

[$\simeq$ A-normal form on steroids, used for typing only]

- ▶ Apply $[V]$ on **every** subexpression
⇒ Define **each subexpression** in a separate definition
- ▶ Substitute **all** occurrences of a subexpression
⇒ Two occurrences of the same expression share the **same definition**

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$$\begin{aligned} MSCF(\lambda x. (f\ x \in \text{Int}) ? ((f\ x) + x + 1) : 42) = \\ \lambda x. \text{bind } u = x + 1 \text{ in} \\ \quad \text{bind } v = f\ x \text{ in} \\ \quad \text{bind } w = v + u \text{ in} \\ \quad \text{bind } y = (v \in \text{Int}) ? w : 42 \text{ in} \\ \quad y \end{aligned}$$

Maximal-Sharing Canonical Form

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Atomic expressions $\mathbf{a} ::= c \mid \lambda x. \kappa \mid (x, x) \mid xx \mid (x \in \tau) ? x : x \mid \dots$

Canonical Forms $\kappa ::= x \mid \text{bind } x = \mathbf{a} \text{ in } \kappa$

$[V]$ now becomes:

$$[V] \frac{\Gamma \vdash e' : t_1 \vee t_2 \quad \Gamma, x : t_1 \vdash e : t \quad \Gamma, x : t_2 \vdash e : t}{\Gamma \vdash \text{bind } x = e' \text{ in } e : t}$$

Annotations

Example

$MSCF(\lambda x. (f\ x \in \text{Int}) ? ((f\ x) + x + 1) : 42) =$

$\lambda x : \{\text{Int}, \neg\text{Int}\}.$

bind $u : \{(x:\text{Int}) \triangleright \text{Int}\} = x + 1$ in

bind $v : \{\text{Int}, \text{Bool}\} = f\ x$ in

bind $w : \{(u:\text{Int}, v:\text{Int}) \triangleright \text{Int}\} = v + u$ in

bind $y : \{\text{Int}, 42\} = (v \in \text{Int}) ? w : 42$ in

y

Annotations

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Results:

- ▶ $e \text{ typable} \iff MSCF(e) \text{ typable} \iff \text{annotated-}MSCF(e) \text{ typable}$
- ▶ Transforming into MSCF is effective
- ▶ Type-checking for annotated MSCFs is decidable

Annotations

Example

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Results:

- ▶ e typable $\iff MSCF(e)$ typable $\iff$ annotated- $MSCF(e)$ typable
- ▶ Transforming into $MSCF$ is effective
- ▶ Type-checking for annotated $MSCFs$ is decidable

Is e typable?

If possible to annotate $MSCF(e)$ to give it some type t , then
 $\vdash e : t$.

Otherwise, e is not typable.

Annotations

Example

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Results:

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Is e typable?

We defined and implemented a sound algorithm that determines annotations using an analysis of the applications and typecases

Examples from our prototype

- 1 **type** Falsy = False | "" | 0
- 2 **type** Truthy = ~Falsy

Examples from our prototype

```
1 type Falsy = False | "" | 0
2 type Truthy = ~Falsy
```

```
1 let not_ x =
2   if x is Truthy then false
3   else true
```

```
1 let to_Bool x = not_ (not_ x)
```

```
1 let and_ x y =
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```
1 let or_ x y =
2   not_ (and_ (not_ x) (not_ y))
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Current and future work

This work (collaboration with Giuseppe Castagna (IRIF) and Mickaël Laurent (IRIF & LMF)) has been presented at POPL22. Since then

- Polymorphism:

```
1 concat : [ 'a * ] -> [ 'b* ] -> [ 'a* 'b* ]  
2 filter : (( 'a & 'b ) -> True & ( 'a \ 'b ) -> False) -> [ 'a* ] ->  
    [ ( 'a&'b )* ]
```

- Started work on integrating side effects (with Thibaut Balabonski and Philippe Volte–Viera, PEPR Secureval).