### Deductive Program Verification with Why3

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Digicosme Spring School April 22, 2013

http://why3.lri.fr/digicosme-spring-school-2013/


### definition



### this is not new



A. M. Turing. Checking a large routine. 1949.



### this is not new



Tony Hoare.

Proof of a program: FIND.

Commun. ACM, 1971.

| k        |   |          |
|----------|---|----------|
| $\leq v$ | ٧ | $\geq v$ |

## which programs? which specs?



#### programs

- pseudo code / mainstream languages / DSL
- small / large

#### specs

- safety, i.e. the program does not crash
- absence of arithmetic overflow
- complex behavioral property, e.g. "sorts an array"

### which logic?



- too rich: we won't be able to automate proofs
- too poor: we can't model programming languages and we can't specify programs

#### typically, a compromise

• e.g. first-order logic + equality + arithmetic

### what about proofs?



#### a gift: theorem provers

- proof assistants: Coq, PVS, Isabelle, etc.
- TPTP provers: Vampire, Eprover, SPASS, etc.
- SMT solvers: CVC3, Z3, Yices, Alt-Ergo, etc.
- dedicated provers

### extracting verification conditions

a well-known technique: weakest preconditions (Dijkstra 1971, Barnett/Leino 2005)

yet doing it for a realistic programming language is a lot of work

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a well-known technique: weakest preconditions (Dijkstra 1971, Barnett/Leino 2005)

yet doing it for a realistic programming language is a lot of work

instead, we design an simpler language from which we extract VCs

#### two examples:

- Boogie (Microsoft Research)
- Why3 (Univ. Paris Sud / Inria)

### Why3 in a nutshell

- a programming language, WhyML
  - polymorphism
  - pattern-matching
  - exceptions
  - mutable data structures, with controlled aliasing

- a polymorphic first-order logic
  - algebraic data types
  - recursive definitions
  - inductive and coinductive predicates

file.mlw WhyML **VCgen** file.why Why transform/translate print/run CVC4 Coq Alt-Ergo

http://why3.lri.fr/


## applications

#### three different ways of using Why3


- as a logical language

   (a convenient front-end to many theorem provers)
- as a programming language to prove algorithms (many examples in our gallery)
- as an intermediate language, to verify programs written in C, Java, Ada, etc.

## some systems using Why3



## Why3, bottom up



### Part I

one logic to use them all

### using theorem provers

there are many theorem provers

- SMT solvers: Alt-Ergo, Z3, CVC3, Yices, etc.
- TPTP provers: Vampire, Eprover, SPASS, etc.
- proof assistants: Coq, PVS, Isabelle, etc.
- dedicated provers, e.g. Gappa

we want to use all of them if possible

we make a compromise

#### in a nutshell

logic of Why3 = polymorphic first-order logic, with

- (mutually) recursive algebraic data types
- (mutually) recursive function/predicate symboles
- (mutually) inductive predicates
- let-in, match-with, if-then-else

formal definition in Expressing Polymorphic Types in a Many-Sorted Language (FroCos 2011) One Logic To Use Them All (CADE 2013) demo 1: the logic of Why3


#### declarations

- types
  - abstract: type t
  - alias: type t = list int
  - algebraic: type list 'a = Nil | Cons 'a (list 'a)
- function / predicate
  - uninterpreted: function f int : int
  - defined: predicate non\_empty (1: list 'a) = 1 <> Nil
- inductive predicate
  - inductive trans t t = ...
- axiom / lemma / goal
  - goal G: forall x: int. x >= 0 -> x\*x >= 0

### theories

logic declarations organized in theories


- a theory  $T_1$  can be
  - used (use) in a theory  $T_2$
  - cloned (clone) in another theory  $T_2$



### theories


#### logic declarations organized in theories

- a theory  $T_1$  can be
  - used (use) in a theory  $T_2$ 
    - symbols of  $T_1$  are shared
    - axioms of  $T_1$  remain axioms
    - lemmas of T<sub>1</sub> become axioms
    - ullet goals of  $T_1$  are ignored
  - cloned (clone) in another theory  $T_2$



#### logic declarations organized in theories

- a theory  $T_1$  can be
  - used (use) in a theory  $T_2$
  - cloned (clone) in another theory  $T_2$ 
    - declarations of T<sub>1</sub> are copied or substituted
    - axioms of T<sub>1</sub> remain axioms or become lemmas/goals
    - lemmas of T<sub>1</sub> become axioms
    - goals of  $T_1$  are ignored




### under the hood

a technology to talk to provers

#### central concept: task

- a context (a list of declarations)
- a goal (a formula)






Alt-Ergo

**Z**3


Vampire





Alt-Ergo

**Z**3

Vampire







### transformations

- eliminate algebraic data types and match-with
- eliminate inductive predicates
- eliminate if-then-else, let-in
- encode polymorphism, encode types
- etc.

efficient: results of transformations are memoized

### driver

a task journey is driven by a file

- transformations to apply
- prover's input format
  - syntax
  - predefined symbols / axioms
- prover's diagnostic messages

more details: Why3: Shepherd your herd of provers (Boogie 2011)

## example: Z3 driver (excerpt)

```
printer "smtv2"
valid "^unsat"
invalid "^sat"
transformation "inline trivial"
transformation "eliminate builtin"
transformation "eliminate definition"
transformation "eliminate inductive"
transformation "eliminate_algebraic"
transformation "simplify_formula"
transformation "discriminate"
transformation "encoding_smt"
prelude "(set-logic AUFNIRA)"
theory BuiltIn
   syntax type int "Int"
   syntax type real "Real"
   syntax predicate (=) "(= %1 %2)"
  meta "encoding : kept" type int
end
```

#### Why3 has an OCaml API

- to build terms, declarations, theories, tasks
- to call provers

#### defensive API


- well-typed terms
- well-formed declarations, theories, and tasks

### plug-ins

Why3 can be extended via three kinds of plug-ins

- parsers (new input formats)
- transformations (to be used in drivers)
- printers (to add support for new provers)

### API and plug-ins



#### summary

- numerous theorem provers are supported
  - Coq, SMT, TPTP, Gappa
- user-extensible system
  - input languages
  - transformations
  - output syntax
- efficient
  - e.g. transformations are memoized

#### more details:


- Why3: Shepherd your herd of provers. (Boogie 2011)
- Preserving User Proofs Across Specification Changes (VSTTE 2013)

## Part II

# program verification


### demo 2: an historical example

A. M. Turing. Checking a Large Routine. 1949.



#### demo 2: an historical example

A. M. Turing. Checking a Large Routine. 1949.



$$u \leftarrow 1$$
  
for  $r = 0$  to  $n - 1$  do  
 $v \leftarrow u$   
for  $s = 1$  to  $r$  do  
 $u \leftarrow u + v$ 

demo (access code)

## demo 3: another historical example

$$f(n) = \left\{ egin{array}{ll} n-10 & ext{si } n > 100, \\ f(f(n+11)) & ext{sinon.} \end{array} 
ight.$$

#### demo 3: another historical example

$$f(n) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} n-10 & \text{si } n > 100, \\ f(f(n+11)) & \text{sinon.} \end{array} \right.$$
 
$$\begin{array}{l} \text{demo (access code)} \end{array}$$
 
$$\begin{array}{l} e \leftarrow 1 \\ \text{while } e > 0 \text{ do} \\ \text{if } n > 100 \text{ then} \\ n \leftarrow n-10 \\ e \leftarrow e-1 \\ \text{else} \end{array}$$

 $n \leftarrow n + 11$  $e \leftarrow e + 1$ 

return n

demo (access code)

## Recapitulation

pre/postcondition

```
let foo x y z
  requires { P } ensures { Q }
  = ...
```

• loop invariant

```
while ... do invariant \{I\} ... done
for i = ... do invariant \{I(i)\} ... done
```

## Recapitulation

termination of a loop (resp. a recursive function) is ensured by a variant

variant 
$$\{t\}$$
 with  $R$ 

- R is a well-founded order relation
- t decreases for R at each step (resp. each recursive call)

by default, t is of type int and R is the relation

$$y \prec x \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} y < x \land 0 \le x$$

#### remark

as show with function 91, proving termination may require to establish behavioral properties as well

#### another example:

• Floyd's cycle detection (Hare and Tortoise algorithm)

#### data structures

up to now, we have only used integers

let us consider more complex data structures

- arrays
- algebraic data types

#### Why3 standard library provides arrays

#### that is

a polymorphic type

an access operation, written

an assignment operation, written

$$a[e1] \leftarrow e2$$

• operations create, append, sub, copy, etc.

#### demo 4: two-way sort

sort an array of Boolean, using the following algorithm

```
let two_way_sort (a: array bool) =
  let i = ref 0 in
  let j = ref (length a - 1) in
  while !i < !j do
    if not a[!i] then
                                False
                                                     True
      incr i
    else if a[!j] then
      decr j
    else begin
      let tmp = a[!i] in
      a[!i] \leftarrow a[!j];
      a[!j] <- tmp;
      incr i;
                                          demo (access code)
      decr j
    end
  done
```

# exercise 1: Dutch national flag

an array contains elements of the following enumerated type

```
type color = Blue | White | Red
```

sort it, in such a way we have the following final situation:

```
... Blue ... ... White ... ... Red ...
```

## exercise: Dutch national flag

```
let dutch_flag (a:array color) (n:int) =
 let b = ref 0 in
 let i = ref 0 in
 let r = ref n in
  while !i < !r do
     match a[!i] with
     | Blue ->
         swap a !b !i;
         incr b;
         incr i
     | White ->
         incr i
     | Red ->
         decr r;
         swap a !r !i
     end
  done
```

#### remark

as for termination, proving safety (such as absence of array access our of bounds) may be arbitrarily difficult

#### an example:

• Knuth's algorithm for N first primes (TAOCP vol. 1)

# demo 5: Boyer-Moore's majority

given a multiset of N votes



determine the majority, if any

### an elegant solution

due to Boyer & Moore (1980)

linear time

uses only three variables

#### MJRTY—A Fast Majority Vote Algorithm


Robert S. Boyer and J Strother Moore

Computer Sciences Department University of Texas at Austin and

Computational Logic, Inc. 1717 West Sixth Street, Suite 290 Austin, Texas

#### Abstract


A new algorithm is presented for determining which, if any, of an arbitrary number of candidates has received a majority of the votes cast in an election.



$$\begin{array}{ccc} \texttt{cand} & \texttt{=} & \texttt{A} \\ \texttt{k} & \texttt{=} & \texttt{1} \end{array}$$




cand = 
$$A$$
  
k =  $2$ 




$$cand = A$$
$$k = 3$$




cand = 
$$A$$
  
k =  $2$ 




$$cand = A$$
$$k = 1$$




$$cand = A$$
$$k = 0$$




$$cand = B$$
$$k = 1$$




$$cand = B$$
$$k = 0$$




$$cand = C$$
$$k = 1$$




cand = 
$$C$$
  
k =  $2$ 




$$cand = C$$
$$k = 1$$



$$cand = C$$
$$k = 2$$



$$cand = C$$
 $k = 3$ 



$$cand = C$$
$$k = 3$$

then we check if C indeed has majority, with a second pass (in that case, it has: 7>13/2)

#### Fortran

```
SUBROUTINE MJRTY(A, N, BOOLE, CAND)
     INTEGER N
     INTEGER A
     LOGICAL BOOLE
     INTEGER CAND
     INTEGER I
     INTEGER K
     DIMENSION A(N)
     K = 0
C
     THE FOLLOWING DO IMPLEMENTS THE PAIRING PHASE. CAND IS
     THE CURRENTLY LEADING CANDIDATE AND K IS THE NUMBER OF
     UNPAIRED VOTES FOR CAND.
     DO 100 I = 1, N
     IF ((K .EQ. 0)) GOTO 50
     IF ((CAND .EQ. A(I))) GOTO 75
     K = (K - 1)
     GOTO 100
50 CAND = A(I)
     K = 1
     GOTO 100
    K = (K + 1)
100 CONTINUE
     IF ((K .EQ. 0)) GOTO 300
     BOOLE = .TRUE.
     IF ((K .GT. (N / 2))) RETURN
C
     WE NOW ENTER THE COUNTING PHASE. BOOLE IS SET TO TRUE
    IN ANTICIPATION OF FINDING CAND IN THE MAJORITY. K IS
     USED AS THE RUNNING TALLY FOR CAND. WE EXIT AS SOON
     AS K EXCEEDS N/2.
     K = 0
     DO 200 I = 1, N
     IF ((CAND .NE. A(I))) GOTO 200
     K = (K + 1)
     IF ((K .GT. (N / 2))) RETURN
200 CONTINUE
300 BOOLE = .FALSE.
     RETURN
     END
```

# Why3

```
let mjrty (a: array candidate) =
 let n = length a in
  let cand = ref a[0] in let k = ref 0 in
  for i = 0 to n-1 do
    if !k = 0 then begin cand := a[i]; k := 1 end
    else if !cand = a[i] then incr k else decr k
  done:
  if !k = 0 then raise Not_found;
  try
    if 2 * !k > n then raise Found; k := 0;
    for i = 0 to n-1 do
      if a[i] = !cand then begin
        incr k; if 2 * !k > n then raise Found
      end
    done:
    raise Not found
  with Found ->
    !cand
  end
```

### specification

precondition

```
let mjrty (a: array candidate)
  requires { 1 <= length a }</pre>
```

• postcondition in case of success

#### ensures

```
{ 2 * numof a result 0 (length a) > length a }
```

postcondition in case of failure

```
raises { Not_found ->
  forall c: candidate.
    2 * numof a c 0 (length a) <= length a }</pre>
```

each loop is given a loop invariant

```
for i = 0 to n-1 do
  invariant { 0 <= !k <= i /\
    numof a !cand 0 i >= !k /
    2 * (numof a ! cand 0 i - !k) <= i - !k / 
    forall c: candidate.
      c \iff !cand \implies 2 * numof a c 0 i \iff i - !k
for i = 0 to n-1 do
  invariant \{ !k = numof a ! cand 0 i / 2 * !k <= n \}
```

#### the verification condition expresses

- safety
  - array access within bounds
  - termination
- validity of annotations
  - invariants are initialized and preserved
  - postconditions are established

automatically discharged by SMT solvers

## ghost code

may be inserted for the purpose of specification and/or proof

#### rules are:

- ghost code may read regular data (but can't modify it)
- ghost code cannot modify the control flow of regular code
- regular code does not see ghost data

in particular, ghost code may be removed without observable modification

#### demo 6: ring buffer

a circular buffer is implemented within an array

len elements are stored, starting at index first



they may wrap around the array bounds



### demo 6: ring buffer

we add an extra ghost field to model the buffer contents

ghost code is added to set this ghost field accordingly

#### example:

we link the array contents and the ghost field with a type invariant

```
type buffer 'a =
invariant {
  let size = Array.length self.data in
  0 <= self.first < size /\</pre>
  0 <= self.len <= size /\
  self.len = L.length self.sequence /\
  forall i: int. 0 <= i < self.len ->
    (self.first + i < size ->
       nth i self.sequence =
       Some self.data[self.first + i]) /\
    (0 <= self.first + i - size ->
       nth i self.sequence =
       Some self.data[self.first + i - size])
}
```

#### such a type invariant

- is assumed at function entry
- must be ensured for values returned or modified

alternatively, we could have introduced a logical function mapping the buffer to a list

```
function buffer_model (b: buffer 'a) : list 'a
(* + suitable axioms *)
```

#### but ghost code

- is more compact
- results in simpler proofs (it provides explicit witnesses)

### other data structures

a key idea of Hoare logic:

any types and symbols from the logic can be used in programs


note: we already used type int this way


# algebraic data types

we can do so with algebraic data types

in the library, we find


given two binary trees, do they contain the same elements when traversed in order?







```
type elt
type tree =
  | Empty
  | Node tree elt tree
function elements (t: tree) : list elt = match t with
  | Empty -> Nil
  | Node 1 x r -> elements 1 ++ Cons x (elements r)
end
let same_fringe (t1 t2: tree) : bool
  ensures { result=True <-> elements t1 = elements t2 }
  . . .
```

one solution: look at the left branch as a list, from bottom up



one solution: look at the left branch as a list, from bottom up





demo (access code)

#### exercise 2: inorder traversal

```
inorder traversal of t, storing its elements in array a
  let rec fill (t: tree) (a: array elt) (start: int) : int =
    match t with
    | N1111 ->
        start
    | Node | x r ->
        let res = fill l a start in
        if res <> length a then begin
          a[res] \leftarrow x;
           fill r a (res + 1)
        end else
          res
     end
```

type tree = Null | Node tree elt tree

type elt

# Part III

# controlled aliasing

### mutable data

```
only one kind of mutable data structure: records with mutable fields
```

```
for instance, references are defined this way
  type ref 'a = { mutable contents : 'a }
and ref, !, and := are regular functions
```

similarly, the library introduces arrays as follows:

```
type array 'a model { length: int; mutable elts: map int 'a }
```

keyword model instead of = makes a distinction

- in programs, array 'a is an abstract data type
- in the logic, array 'a is a (immutable) record type

# operations on arrays

```
one cannot define operations over type array 'a (it is abstract) but one may declare them
```

#### examples:

```
val ([]) (a: array 'a) (i: int) : 'a
  requires { 0 <= i < length a }
  ensures { result = a[i] }

val ([]<-) (a: array 'a) (i: int) (v: 'a) : unit
  requires { 0 <= i < length a }
  writes { a.elts }
  ensures { a.elts = M.set (old a.elts) i v }</pre>
```

### nested mutable data structures

mutable data structures can be nested

```
example: hash tables

type t 'a = {
   mutable size: int;
   mutable data: array (list (key, 'a));
}

field data is mutable to allow resizing
```

# controlled aliasing

but WhyML imposes a static control of aliasing

why? to get simpler verification conditions how? using regions (internally)

```
consider hash tables again
  type t 'a = {
    mutable size: int;
    mutable data: array (list (key, 'a));
a function resize (called from add) enlarges the bucket array
  let resize (h: t 'a) : unit
    writes { h.data }
    let nsize = 2 * Array.length h.data + 1 in
    let ndata = Array.make nsize Nil in
    ... rehash all values ...
    h.data <- ndata
```

### demo 8: hash tables

#### then the following code is rejected

```
let alias (h: t int) (k: key) : unit =
  let old_data = h.data in
  add h k 42;
  old_data[0] <- Nil</pre>
```

#### with error

This expression prohibits further usage of variable old\_data

indeed, add may call resize, and thus may invalidate old\_data

#### more details:

Why3 — Where Program Meet Provers (ESOP 2013)

# consequence of controlled aliasing

to use Why3 to verify programs with aliasing, you have to come up with a memory model

```
type loc
type value = ...
type state = map loc value
...
```

this is what is done for C, Java, Ada, etc.

# memory model


```
consider for instance C programs with pointers of type int*
a possible model is
    type loc
    val memory: ref (map loc int)
the C expression
    *p
is translated into the Why3 expression
     !memory[p]
```

# memory model

```
there are more subtle models
such as the component-as-array model (Burstall / Bornat)
each structure field is modeled as a separate map
the C type
    struct List {
      int
                     head:
      struct List *next;
    };
is modeled as
    type loc
    val head: ref (map loc int)
    val next: ref (map loc loc)
```

# memory models

such models are used in tools for C, Java, and Ada



### conclusion

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#### we saw three different ways of using Why3

- as a logical language

   (a convenient front-end to many theorem provers)
- as a programming language to prove algorithms (currently 78 examples in our gallery)
- as an intermediate language (for the verification of C, Java, Ada, etc.)

# things not covered in this lecture

- how aliases are excluded
- how verification conditions are computed
- how formulas are sent to provers
- how floating-point arithmetic is modeled
- etc.

see <a href="http://why3.lri.fr">http://why3.lri.fr</a> for more details