Boundaries of Formal Program Verification

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PARTNERSHIP



SPARK – the language



SPARK – flow analysis



SPARK – proof

procedure Stabilize (Mode : in Mode_T; Success : out Boolean) with Pre => Mode /= Off, Post => (if Success then Delta Change (Rotors'Old, Rotors));



SPARK – demo



Bounding the language

Previous SPARK based on its own grammar subset of Ada

- → many restrictions on program structure, control flow, language features
- \rightarrow very hard to show value to new users before commitment!

David A. Wheeler: "Be a good date; commitment happens later"

Now only exclude features that make formal analysis impossible: catching exceptions, using pointers (but ownership pointers on the way)

Bounding the program

Previous SPARK based on opt-out only (with annotation #hide)

- → Need for shadow (spec) files at boundaries (libraries, hardware, OS)
- \rightarrow Not adapted to retrospective analysis

Now a mix of opt-in, opt-out and opt-auto (for included specs)

→ Choice is questioned by some users requiring more flexibility

Code-level specifications and beyond

Previous SPARK based on logical specifications only (#pre, #post)

Now based on executable specifications by default (with escape hatch):

- preconditions, postconditions on subprograms
- predicates, invariants on types

Looking at expanding the specification towards design models:

- data-flow programs in Simulink
- design models in VDM, AADL+AGREE, SysML+SpeAR

Analysis at function level and beyond

Previous SPARK: only function-level analysis (dataflow analysis or proof)
→ Requires too much specification effort

Current SPARK: mostly function-level analysis, but...

- Read/write effects are generated if needed
- Instances of generics (templates) are separately analyzed
- Read/write concurrent accesses are analyzed globally
- Subprograms may be inlined, loops may be unrolled...

Bounding the expertise

From the start, SPARK aimed at "good engineering"



Peter Amey, foreword of "High Integrity Software – the SPARK Approach to Safety and Security", 2002:

"The migration of static analysis from a painful, post-hoc verification exercise to an integral part of a sound development process is now wellestablished."

Most companies still found the expertise required too high

Example of required expertise: manual proof



1. prove c#1 by induction. i. 1. unwrap h#2. inst 1. forw h#4. replace h#4: sigma(1-1) by 0 using eq. y infer sigma(1)=1 using eq. infer c#1 using inequals. prove c#2 by implication. unwrap h#2. inst int i 1+1. forw h#9. replace c#1: A by B using eq. 4. У У Manual Proof stand c#1. У in SPARK 2005 unwrap h#8. inst int i 1. forw h#10. replace c#1: A by B using eq. 6. У V stand c#1. V done exit

Bounding the expertise

Critical change in new SPARK: specification is code

- same semantics in code and specification
- same tools to operate on specification: IDE, compiler, debugger, test
- users never look at Verification Conditions

Tool support is most needed to help users with:

- modularity counterexamples, safety guards, smoke detectors
- induction loop invariant generation, loop unrolling, loop patterns
- undecidability guidance on how to address unproved properties

From tour-de-force to run-of-the-mill

Example: Skein cryptographic hash algorithm in SPARK (Chapman, 2011)

initial version (SPARK 2005)	current version (SPARK 2014)
41 non-trivial contracts for effects and dependencies	1 – effects and dependencies are generated
31 conditions in preconditions and postconditions on internal subprograms	0 – internal subprograms are inlined
43 conditions in loop invariants	1 – loop frame conditions are generated
24 cuts to avoid combinatorial explosion	0 – no combinatorial explosion
22 hint assertions to drive proof	0 – no need
23 manual proofs	0 – no need

Building the expertise



Bounding the effort



Expanding to application on legacy software

Traditional SPARK development known as "Correct-by-Construction"

- \rightarrow Not possible to "sparkify" existing codebases
- \rightarrow Not applicable to legacy codebases

David A. Wheeler: "If a system works, it's a legacy system"

Moving towards application to legacy codebases

 \rightarrow Levels of assurance are critical to support progressive adoption



Implementation Guidance for the Adoption of SPARK AdaCore THALES



Expanding the user base

Traditional SPARK customers: military, avionics, space, security

More recent applications to medical device, automotive, autonomous vehicles

- \rightarrow All in the context of industrial R&D projects / POC
- \rightarrow Still need for general awareness, education, case studies, etc.

Example of successful spreading: seL4 highly visible success → Muen separation kernel in SPARK → SPARK kernels at ANSSI, ETH Zurich, etc.